Leadership and Intelligence Collection
Leadership is an inherently difficult role and especially so when challenging decisions must be made whilst balancing competing interests. Libraries have been filled with books and articles on this topic, and I hardly want to compete with those, but via the lens of an article recently published in Foreign Affairs, I want to look briefly at the communication and intelligence challenges leaders face.
The article, What the Mighty Miss: The Blind Spots of Power, by Ngaire Woods, focuses on Putin’s miscalculations in his invasion of Ukraine, his underestimation of how the Ukrainians would respond, and his overestimation of the strength of his military. While most leaders do not invade other countries, and most do not set themselves up as pariahs on the scale of Mr. Putin, this article does point out several danger zones in communication, intelligence collection, and decision-making that are relevant to leaders at all levels.
Anyone in a leadership position needs accurate information to make difficult decisions, yet the leaders themselves are rarely in a position to go collect that information. When considering expanding into a new market, a CEO does not go out and collect market data, it is collected by associate-level analysts and pushed up a chain until an executive-level VP, also disconnected from the collection process, presents it to the CEO.
As the information is passed up the chain, at each link it is changed, most times unintentionally, but nonetheless begins to reflect ego elements of the collectors as well as their efforts to align with the message they anticipate the next level wants to hear. For instance, if it is believed the CEO is intent on expanding into a specific new market, the data, and the accompanying narrative, will be increasingly biased toward supporting that decision.
I believe it highly likely that lower-level Russian military personnel were aware of the defects in Russian military equipment and the deficits in military supplies. And I’m certain that Russia has had intelligence officers in the eastern regions of Ukraine that could have provided fairly accurate reports as the levels of resistance that might be faced. Yet this information did not make it to Putin. Why not?
First, leaders have an agenda, and they communicate that agenda, and in communicating it often tend to believe the goals therein have been or will be achieved. Putin put great effort into modernizing the Russian army and, as Woods points out, was completely unaware of the level of corruption and inefficiency despite his modernization directives.
Second, leaders (and even very well-intentioned leaders) tend to see themselves as exceptional. There is, after all, a reason they are at the top and that final decision power rests with them. This feeling of exceptionalism, according to Woods, results first in leaders feeling the rules don’t necessarily apply to them. Take a CEO who expects subordinates to make decisions based on analysis and data and then makes his or her own decisions based on gut feelings.
When employees see mismatches between what they are told are the rules and the rules the upper echelon follow, the natural tendency is to begin to react against that group, to communicate less and to withhold information, and especially negative information that could make them look bad.
The second outcome, as Woods notes is that “just as power can make leaders think they are stronger than they actually are, so, too, can it isolate them and encourage them not to listen to others.” Putin has his giant table, across which no useful information could be communicated. Other leaders may not have such a ridiculous setup; they may in fact be surround by a strong cabinet or board, yet they still run the risk of cutting themselves off from accurate information.
The moment leaders openly and negatively judge information and ideas presented to them, and the people who have presented the information, they begin to cut themselves off from accurate information and diminish their ability to make the right decision. This becomes a cycle. The more those around see the danger in provided opposing points-of-view, even if supported by data, then less and less accurate information makes its way to the top.
Of course all leaders are not like this, and all leaders don’t necessarily end up in this situation. And it all comes down to how they communicate. Very clearly allowing your team members the autonomy to put forth whatever information they believe is necessary, not judging them or the information, and demonstrating curiosity in the information, will help to avoid all the pitfalls Putin has so helpfully highlighted for us.
One final note relative to curiosity. Most leaders want the “Bottom Line Up Front” and operate from a premise of “just tell me what I need to know.” Picture Putin asking, “Bottom line up front, can my army invade Ukraine?” The answer being “yes sir, of course it can.” This is hyperbole but I’ve seen this play out too many times. The person being questioned has much more context and detail they could provide but they are cut off and the autonomy to provide relevant qualifying information is removed and thus bad decisions are made.
As a leader, if you can practice disengaging from that feeling of exceptionalism and rather engage with a feeling of deep curiosity, you automatically create the opening through which will flow the information needed to make thoughtful, deliberate decisions that benefit your organization. This is at the heart of how intelligence — otherwise known as facts and information — is gathered so it may be analyzed and acted upon. And if you are curious how to do begin doing this, we at Pyxis have a team skilled in this results-driven process and can provide training and consultations for every level of your organization.
